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Abstract The main goal of this paper is to present and compare two approaches to
formalizing cross-world comparisons like ‘‘John might have been taller than he is’’
in quantified modal logics. One is the standard method employing degrees and
graded positives, according to which the example just given is to be paraphrased as
something like ‘‘The height that John has is such that he might have had a height
greater than it,’’ which is amenable to familiar formalization strategies with respect
to quantified modal logic. The other approach, based on subjunctive modal logic,
mimics the mixed indicative-subjunctive patterns typical of cross-world compari-
sons in many natural languages by means of explicit mood markers. This latter
approach is new and should, for various reasons, appeal to linguists and philoso-
phers. Along the way, I argue that attempts to capture cross-world comparison by
means of sentential operators are either inadequate or subject to substantive logical
and philosophical objections.
Keywords Quantified modal logic  Cross-world predication  Possible worlds 
Subjunctivity  Grammatical mood  Degrees  Comparatives
1 Introduction
The notion of cross-world comparison is perhaps best introduced by contrasting it
with its intra-world cousin. Consider the sentences in groups 1 and 2 below.
(1a) John might have been taller than Mary is.
(1b) Johannes h€atte gro¨ßer sein ko¨nnen als Maria ist.
(1c) Jean aurait pu eˆtre plus grand que Marie ne l’est.
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(2a) John might have been taller than Mary.
(2b) Johannes h€atte gro¨ßer sein ko¨nnen als Maria.
(2c) Jean aurait pu eˆtre plus grand que Marie.
The sentences in group 1 make cross-world comparisons: They say that there is a
possible world w such that John, as he is in w, is taller than Mary, as she is in the
actual world w. The sentences in group 2, though they are sometimes used to
convey what their counterparts in group 1 express, are most naturally read as
making intra-world assertions to the effect that there is a world w such that in w,
John is taller than Mary.
Standard quantified modal logic (QML) is built on the assumption that all
predication is intra-world: Its predicate symbols R are assigned extensions Rw
relative to each possible world w, and whether the relation expressed by R holds of
some tuple of arguments a1; . . .; an at w is determined by whether the argument
tuple belongs to Rw. By contrast, the formalization of cross-world comparison seems
to require, on the face of it, that predicate symbols be assigned extensions relative
not just to one world, but across worlds.
The plan of this paper is as follows. I will first define, in Sect. 2, a notion of
Kripke structure that incorporates cross-world extensions, and consider attempts to
implement cross-world comparison in QML by means of sentential operators. Such
attempts will turn out to be either inadequate to the task or logically and
philosophically unattractive. In Sect. 3, I develop an extension of the subjunctive
modal logic (SML) introduced in Wehmeier (2004) that allows for a simple and
natural way of formalizing cross-world comparisons. Section 4 is dedicated to the
received strategy, going back to Russell (1905), of analyzing cross-world
comparison in terms of abstract objects (degrees) added to QML. This approach
is based on a somewhat different notion of Kripke structure, which I define
precisely. In Sect. 5, I compare the methods discussed in the preceding two sections
and argue that the SML-approach developed in Sect. 3 has a leg up over the QML-
based analysis: First, it can make do without the latter’s ontological commitments to
abstract objects, and second, when combined with a degree-analysis, it is able to
represent as substantive certain inferences that the QML-analysis must relegate to
the level of informal paraphrase.
A note about terminology: By ‘‘comparison’’ I understand, for the purposes of
this paper, the attribution of a comparative relation (strict or non-strict), or of an
equivalence relation, to a pair of individuals. For the sake of exposition, I will
discuss only the case of one strict cross-world comparative relation. The case of
non-strict comparatives is entirely analogous, and that of equivalence relations is
simpler. I will briefly indicate in the notes the modifications that would need to be
made in order to cover those other cases.
2 Cross-world extensions and sentential operators
By a signature R we will mean a pair R ¼ ðC;PÞ, consisting of a set C of individual
constants and a set P of predicate symbols. Each P 2 P has a unique arity ]P 1,
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and the binary predicate symbol = is always a member of P. A (standard) Kripke
structure K for such a signature R is a quintuple
K; w; ðDwÞw2K ; ðcKÞc2C; ðPwÞP2Pw2K
 
;
where K is K’s set of worlds; w 2 K is the actual world of K; for each w 2 K, Dw is
a set (the domain of individuals existing in w) such that D :¼ SfDwjw 2 Kg 6¼ ;;
for each constant c 2 C, cK 2 Dw ; and for each n-ary predicate symbol P 2 P, Pw
(the extension of P in w) is a subset of Dw
n. It is required that =w is true identity on
Dw.
1
I will assume familiarity with the notion of a formula of the language LR of QML
for the signature R, as well as the notion of the truth of such a formula / at a world
w of a Kripke structure K under some variable assignment r, Kw/½r. Two points
are perhaps worth recalling: First, by definition, / is true in K (under r) if it is true
in K at the actual world w of K (under r). Second, in order to remedy certain
expressive defects (of which more in Sect. 3), one often sees included in the
language of QML a so-called actuality operator A.2 This is a unary sentential
operator with the property that a formula A/ is true at w in K under the assignment
r just in case / is true at the actual world w of K under r. We will assume that the
language of QML contains the actuality operator, unless otherwise indicated.
The most straightforward way of interpreting cross-world predications seman-
tically is to construe them as asserting relations between individuals in different
possible worlds (typically, if not invariably, the actual world and a counterfactual
one). For instance, the sentences in group (1) above make a comparison between
John in some possible world w and Mary in the actual world w. Suppose, then, that
R is a binary predicate intended to stand for a cross-world comparative (say the
predicate of being taller than, for definiteness). Standard Kripke structures K assign
R an extension with respect to each possible world w, so that we may compare the
individuals in any Dw with respect to R. For cross-world predications, we also want
to compare individuals from any Dv with individuals in any Dw with respect to R,
and hence we will assign an extension Rv;w  Dv  Dw to R for any pair hv, wi of
possible worlds. To say that John, in w, is taller than Mary is in w then just means
that the pair hjK; mKi belongs to the extension Rw;w .
Formally, we proceed as follows. Let R ¼ ðC;PÞ be a standard signature, and let
R be a binary predicate symbol. A cross-world Kripke structure (CW-structure for
short) K for R with the cross-world comparative R is then a sextuple
K; w; ðDwÞw2K ; ðcKÞc2C; ðPwÞP2Pw2K ; ðRv;wÞv;w2K
 
;
whose first five components are exactly as in the standard notion of Kripke structure.
In addition, for any v and w in K, Rv;w  Dv  Dw.
1 In suppressing mention of an accessibility relation, I am restricting attention to Kripke structures for the
standard modal predicate logic S5. This seems reasonable, both because this semantic setting seems to be
the accepted one for the metaphysical modalities under consideration in this paper, and because it
illustrates the semantical and syntactical innovations against as simple a background as possible.
2 The locus classicus for the actuality operator is (Crossley and Humberstone 1977).
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Since R is intended to be interpreted as a strict comparative across worlds, we
also require that the relation R defined below be a strict comparative relation on
fha; vijv 2 K; a 2 Dvg:
ha; viRhb; wi :, ha; bi 2 Rv;w:
Here, a binary relation S on a set A is a strict comparative if and only if it is (a) a
strict partial ordering, that is, irreflexive and transitive, and (b) weakly connected on
A in the following sense: Whenever elements a and b of A are not comparable with
respect to S, then exactly the same members of A bear S to a as do to b, and a bears S
to exactly the same members of A as b does.3 The relevance of this constraint will
become apparent later.
The first observation I wish to make is that the actuality operator is useless for the
formalization of cross-world comparison, even under the restriction that one of the
worlds involved must be the actual one.
This may be mildly surprising, given the tendency on the part of some writers to
formulate cross-world predications with the help of the English adverb ‘‘actually,’’ as in
John might have been taller than Mary actually is.4
A moment’s reflection, however, shows that the actuality operator cannot
possibly trigger our new cross-world relations. After all, the language of QML is
already fully interpretable in the original kind of Kripke structure, i.e. the one
without cross-world extensions. And intuitively, it is clear that there are no
syntactical combinations of }, A, and the atomic formula Rjm that would be true at
a world w just in case the pair hjK; mKi belongs to the cross-world extension Rw;w :
Rjm must either lie entirely within the scope of some A, in which case the intra-
world extension Rw;w is triggered, or entirely outside the scopes of all A, in which
case the intra-world extension Rw,w, with w the world of evaluation, comes into play.
Forbes (1989, p. 75) suggests that cross-world predications could be handled by
means of a ‘‘term-binding ‘actually’ operator At,’’ and offers the formalization
Ab}Sða; bÞ for the sentence ‘‘Your car could have been the same color mine
actually is’’.5 Unfortunately, Forbes does not explain the semantics of this operator;
but it is clear in any case that it is unable adequately to formalize cross-world
comparisons. For consider ‘‘John might have been taller than he is.’’ Neither Aj}Rjj
nor the perhaps slightly more plausible }AjRjj adequately formalizes it, because
both occurrences of j are now bound by the operator Aj.
3 If R is instead intended to be interpreted as a non-strict comparative across worlds, the relation R as
defined above must be a non-strict comparative. Here, S is a non-strict comparative on a set A just in case
(a) S is reflexive on A and transitive and (b) strongly connected on A, that is, whenever a and b are in A,
then at least one of aSb and bSa holds. Finally, if R is to be interpreted as an equivalence relation across
worlds, the relation R as defined above must be an equivalence relation.
4 Cf. similar examples by Forbes (1989, p. 74), Kemp (2000, p. 305), Melia (2003, pp. 32–33), and
Williamson (2006, p. 310; 2009, p. 137).
5 Essentially the same suggestion is found in (Forbes 1985, p. 93), where the term-binding actuality
operator is attributed to Peacocke. In (Forbes 1994, pp. 39–40), a different operator Atx, which Forbes also
attributes to Peacocke, is proposed; it is essentially a variant of the operators A1 and A2 we consider
below.
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Melia (2003, p. 98) notes the uselessness of the standard actuality operator for
our purposes and observes:
Speaking intuitively, we want to put the A operator inside the predicate, and
write something like }ðRaAbÞ (. . .).
The kind of occurrence of the actuality operator envisaged by Melia is of course
not permitted by the syntax of QML. Indeed, the A-operator is a sentential operator,
whereas in Melia’s }ðRaAbÞ, it is used rather as an operator on the argument places
of a predicate symbol. But the general idea of introducing an operator that acts on
individual argument places seems promising and merits investigation. Its most
straightforward implementation would appear to be the following.
Let A1 and A2 be new unary sentential operators. The semantics for these
operators should imply that Ai, when prefixed to an atomic formula Rab, forces the
i-th argument place of R to be evaluated with respect to the actual world, rather than
the world of evaluation. More precisely, we want the following two clauses to hold6:
(A1) K w A1Rt1t2 ½r iff hvalKr ðt1Þ; valKr ðt2Þi 2 Rw;w
(A2) K w A2Rt1t2 ½r iff hvalKr ðt1Þ; valKr ðt2Þi 2 Rw;w
In the presence of operators abiding by (A1) and (A2), we can adequately
formalize our examples in group (1) as
}A2Rjm;
as is easily verified.
Reasonable as the introduction of A1 and A2 may seem, and notwithstanding their
success in assigning formalizations with the right truth conditions to the sentences in
group (1), there are reasons to be dissatisfied with these operators.
First, they are hyperintensional7: necessary equivalence of formulas is no
guarantee that they will be intersubstitutible in Ai-contexts. For instance, if R and S
are both strict cross-world comparatives (say R stands for ‘‘richer than’’ and S for
‘‘smarter than’’), the sentence hðRaa $ SaaÞ is true in every model, while models
exist in which }A2Raa is true and }A2Saa false. That cross-world comparison
should force us to introduce hyperintensional operators into an antecedently non-
hyperintensional language speaks against this approach.
Hyperintensionality, however, is not the only problem with the Ai. So far, we
have specified the truth conditions for formulas Ai/ only for the case where / is of
the form Rt1t2; but in order for Ai to be a proper logical operator, we must state the
semantic clause for formulas of the form Ai/ generally.
8 The only case where we
have strong intuitions as to the intended behavior of the operators Ai at all is when
6 Here valKr ðtÞ is the value of the term t in the structure K under the variable assignment r. Cf. Definition
2 below.
7 I owe this observation to Tim Williamson.
8 Indeed, if at all possible, the semantic clause for Ai/ should be stated independently of the form of the
argument /. But this desideratum simply cannot be met. Consider, for instance, the relatively simple
cases of A1ð/ ^ wÞ and A1Rjm. We know that A1Rjm is to be true at w just in case ðjK; mKÞ 2 Rw ;w, but
there is nothing analogous we could require for the truth of A1ð/ ^ wÞ at w, nor does there seem to be a
general clause that could subsume that for A1Rjm and whichever one we pick for A1ð/ ^ wÞ.
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they occur in front of an atomic formula Rt1t2; but under which conditions
Aið/ ^ wÞ, say, should be true at a world w is entirely up for grabs. We could
stipulate this to be equivalent to the truth of both Ai/ and Aiw at w, or to be always
false (or true), or equivalent to /^w. The difficulties of even settling on a general
semantics for A1 and A2 suggest that these devices aren’t really sentential operators
at all.9 We will see in a moment that the Ai are really predicate markers (for
indicative mood) in disguise.
3 Cross-world subjunctive modal logic
In Wehmeier (2004), I considered sentences like the following:
(3a) Under certain circumstances, everybody who is rich would have been poor.
(3b) Es h€atte sein ko¨nnen, daß jeder, der reich ist, arm gewesen w€are.
(3c) Il aurait pu se faire que tous ceux qui sont riches soient pauvres.
The natural reading for (3a)–(3c), in possible-worlds jargon, seems to be that there
exists a world w such that everyone who is rich in the actual world, w, is poor in w.
As it turns out, there is no sentence in the language of QML (without the actuality
operator) that adequately formalizes this reading (cf. Wehmeier 2003).
Indeed, a moment’s reflection leads one to suspect as much. One would expect a
formalization of (3a)–(3c) to result from the skeleton Vx (Rx ? Px) by the insertion
of a diamond. Now
}8xðRx ! PxÞ
is inadequate, because once the diamond has sent us to some possible world w, the
sentence Vx (Rx? Px) is evaluated there; however, Rx must be evaluated at w to
capture the reading at hand. The sentence
8x}ðRx ! PxÞ
fails for the same reason, but has the additional drawback that it doesn’t require one
possible world that works for all individuals (the world required to exist by the
diamond might depend on x). In other words, we have here a VA-combination, while
the reading we’re interested in requires an AV-combination. This is also why
8xðRx ! }PxÞ
fails as a formalization of (3a)–(3c), even though, in this case, the predicate Rx does
contribute Rw , its extension at w
, to the sentence’s truth condition.
This expressive deficit is clearly due to the fact that in the language of QML,
absent the actuality operator, there is only one way of ensuring that a predicate be
evaluated at w rather than at the world of evaluation: by having the predicate occur
outside of the scopes of all modal operators. This suggests that the indicative-
subjunctive distinction is not exhaustively explained by correlating indicative
9 One could also try to define operators S1 and S2 that stand to Humberstone’s (1982) operator S (cf.
Sect. 3) as A1 and A2 stand to A. But analogous considerations speak against the status of the Si as full-
fledged operators.
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predicates with those lying outside the scopes of modal operators, and subjunctive
ones with those that occur within such scopes.10 In sentences (3a)–(3c), for instance,
one wants the indicative predicates (‘‘is rich,’’ ‘‘reich ist,’’ ‘‘sont riches’’) to lie
within the scope of the governing possibility operator.
Humberstone (1982) observed that this expressive deficit could be overcome by
introducing a subjunctivity operator S. This approach is very similar in spirit to the
method of subjunctive markers I developed independently much later (Wehmeier
2004, 2005) in that both S and my subjunctive marker signal the presence of a
bindable world-variable. My main objection to Humberstone’s formalism is that S is
syntactically a sentential operator, but cannot be allowed the freedom of syntactic
occurrence characteristic of such operators. It would seem that this objection is
confirmed in the present context by the considerations adduced in footnote 9 above.11
My own proposal, in any case, was to model the indicative-subjunctive
distinction in the object language by making a predicate’s mood syntactically
explicit, using mood markers ‘‘i’’ (for ‘‘indicative’’) and ‘‘s’’ (for ‘‘subjunctive’’).12
This leads to the following:
Definition 1 Let R ¼ ðC;PÞ be a signature. The terms of the associated language
LsR of subjunctive modal logic (SML) are the individual variables (x; y; z; x0; x1; . . .),
and the individual constants from C. If R is an n-ary predicate symbol from P, and
t1; . . .; tn are terms of LsR, then both Rit1. . . tn and Rst1. . . tn are atomic formulas of
LsR. We sometimes refer to Ri as an indicative predicate, and to Rs as a subjunctive
predicate. The formulas of LsR are generated from its atomic formulas by means of
the propositional connectives, the modal operators h and }, the indicative
quantifiers Vi and Ai, as well as the subjunctive quantifiers Vs and As. A formula is
individually closed if it contains no free occurrences of individual variables, and
subjunctively closed if every subjunctive marker ‘‘s’’ in the formula occurs within
the scope of some modal operator. A formula is a sentence if it is both individually
and subjunctively closed.
Before we move on to the semantics for LsR, some explanations may be in order.
(a) The mood distinction for quantifiers, first introduced in (Wehmeier 2005), is
needed in order to deal with varying domains in Kripke structures (much like
the actuality quantifiers of Hazen 1990). The idea that quantifiers can occur in
both indicative and subjunctive mood is not absurd: In English, we certainly
have both indicative (‘‘there exist,’’ ‘‘there are’’) and subjunctive (‘‘there
would have existed,’’ ‘‘there would have been’’) existential quantifiers.
10 It might have been more appropriate to speak of the realis-irrealis distinction rather than
the indicative-subjunctive distinction, as a number of moods can serve to express the irrealis, such as
the conditional and subjunctive moods in English, the conditionnel and subjonctif in French, and the
Konjunktiv II in German. I stick with the indicative-subjunctive terminology mostly because it is
somewhat entrenched in the logical literature.
11 See also (Wehmeier 2005, p. 200), as well as the discussion in (Humberstone 2004, pp. 46–49).
12 In earlier work, I used only the subjunctive marker ‘‘s’’ and regarded unmarked predicates as
indicative. This has certain notational disadvantages for the case of cross-world predication. Clearly the
switch to marking both moods is immaterial, as the resulting languages are trivial variants of each other.
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(b) In ordinary predicate logic, individually closed formulas are of special interest
because their truth values do not depend on the choice of a variable
assignment; they are true or false simpliciter. Subjunctively closed formulas
are, as we will see shortly, true or false regardless of the choice of a world of
evaluation, and thus sentences in the sense of Definition 1 are true or false
simpliciter (relative neither to a choice of values for the variables nor to the
choice of a world of evaluation).
(c) QML with actuality operator (and actuality quantifiers) is expressively
equivalent to SML in the sense that for every sentence of one system, there
is a sentence of the other that has the same class of Kripke models.
Nevertheless, the two systems are not simply notational variants of each other.
See (Wehmeier 2005).
Next, the semantics for LsR.
Definition 2 Let K ¼ K; w; ðDwÞw2K ; ðcKÞc2C; ðPwÞP2Pw2K
 
be a standard Kripke
structure for R ¼ ðC;PÞ. Let r be a variable assignment, that is, a function from the
individual variables into D ¼ Sw2K Dw. For any variable x and a 2 D, r(x/a) is the
x-variant of r that maps x to a. Where x is an individual variable, we let valKr ðxÞ be
r(x), and where c 2 C, we put valKr ðcÞ :¼ cK. In this way, we have specified a value
valKr ðtÞ 2 D for every term t of LsR. Next, we define the notion of truth in a Kripke
structure with respect to a variable assignment r and a salient possible world w by
recursion as follows:
• K w Rit1. . . tn½r iff hvalKr ðt1Þ; . . .; valKr ðtnÞi 2 Rw (that is, indicative predicates
are evaluated at the actual world, no matter what the salient possible world is);
• K w Rst1. . . tn½r iff hvalKr ðt1Þ; . . .; valKr ðtnÞi 2 Rw (that is, subjunctive predi-
cates are always evaluated at the salient possible world);
• K w / ^ w½r iff K w /½r and K w w½r, and similarly for the other
propositional connectives;
• K w 8ix/½r iff for every a 2 Dw , K w /½rðx=aÞ, and similarly for Ai (that
is, the indicative quantifiers range over the domain of the actual world, no matter
what the salient possible world is);
• K w 8sx/½r iff for every a 2 Dw, K w /½rðx=aÞ, and similarly for As (that
is, the subjunctive quantifiers range over the domain of the salient possible
world);
• K w }/½r iff for some v 2 K, K v /½r;
• K w h/½r iff for all v 2 K, K v /½r.
It is easy to see that for individually closed /, whether or not K w /½r is
independent of r, so for such formulas we may define K w / as, say, K w /½r
for every variable assignment r. Similarly, for subjunctively closed formulas /,
whether or not K w /½r is independent of w, and so for such formulas we may
define K  /½r as, say, K w /½r for all w 2 K. For sentences / we thus have a
notion of truth in K simpliciter, namely K  / iff for every variable assignment r
and every world w 2 K, K w /½r.
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The logic determined by these syntactic and semantic definitions will be called
subjunctive modal logic or SML, following the terminology of (Wehmeier 2004). It
is easy to see that the SML-sentence }8ixðRix ! PsxÞ formalizes the sentences in
group (3) above. We have:
K  }8ixðRix ! PsxÞ
iff for every r and w, K w }8ixðRix ! PsxÞ½r
iff for every r and w, there is a v such that K v 8ixðRix ! PsxÞ½r
iff for every r there is a v such that for all a 2 Dw , K v Rix ! Psx½rðx=aÞ
iff for every r there is a v such that for all a 2 Dw , if K v Rix½rðx=aÞ, then
K v Psx½rðx=aÞ
iff for every r there is a v such that for all a 2 Dw , if rðx=aÞðxÞ 2 Rw , then
rðx=aÞðxÞ 2 Pv
iff there is a v such that for all a 2 Dw , if a 2 Rw , then a 2 Pv
iff there is a v such that Rw  Pv,
which is exactly the desired truth condition.
In order to see how cross-world predication can be implemented in the syntax of
SML, let us consider the following examples:
(4a) Under certain circumstances, John would have been taller than Mary is.
(4b) Es h€atte sein ko¨nnen, dass Johannes gro¨ßer w€are als Maria ist.
(4c) Il aurait pu se faire que Jean soit plus grand que Marie ne l’est.
We see that the cross-world predicates all have two copulas that can be
individually inflected for mood: ‘‘would have been’’ is conditional mood, ‘‘w€are’’ is
Konjunktiv II, and ‘‘soit’’ is subjonctif; by contrast, ‘‘is,’’ ‘‘ist,’’ and ‘‘est’’ are all
indicative. This suggests equipping a predicate symbol intended for cross-world
comparison with two mood markers rather than just one. In other words, if we add a
binary predicate symbol R to the language of SML with the intention of using it for
cross-world comparison, the definition of the formulas is to be supplemented by the
following stipulation:





Now we just need to connect this syntactic innovation up with the cross-world
extensions included in the new type of Kripke structure; but this is easy. We define:
• K w Ri;it1t2½r iff hvalKr ðt1Þ; valKr ðt2Þi 2 Rw;w
• K w Ri;st1t2½r iff hvalKr ðt1Þ; valKr ðt2Þi 2 Rw;w
• K w Rs;it1t2½r iff hvalKr ðt1Þ; valKr ðt2Þi 2 Rw;w
• K w Rs;st1t2½r iff hvalKr ðt1Þ; valKr ðt2Þi 2 Rw;w
Subjunctivity and cross-world predication 115
123
The logical system thus obtained will be called CSML (‘‘cross-world SML’’).
The reader may wish to check for herself that we can adequately formalize the
sentences in groups (1) and (4) in CSML as
}Rs;ijm:
It should be noted that the use of the two mood markers i and s does not exploit the
full resources for cross-world predication that the CW-structures provide, because
we are currently modeling only cross-world predications one of whose worlds is w.
The majority of cross-world predications that occur in English, German, or French
seem to be of this type. There are, however, natural-language statements that require
additional logical resources. Consider
(5) Under certain circumstances, everybody would have been as generous as
they might have been.
I take it that (5) can be analyzed, in possible-worlds parlance, as saying that there
exists a world w such that for every world v, it is not the case that some individual
from w is more generous in v than she is in w; in other words, w is a world of
maximal generosity. CSML, as we have developed it so far, cannot directly
accommodate (5), because the only cross-world comparisons it is equipped to
handle are those that involve the actual world. But (5) requires a cross-world
comparison between two merely possible worlds.
It is not difficult, however, to see how CSML can be extended to a system that
provides logical forms for sentences such as (5): Add to the language of CSML
indexed modal operators h1;h2;}1;}2 as well as indexed quantifiers
81; 82; 91; 92, and allow additional atomic formulas Rsj;sk t1t2, Rsj;it1t2, and Ri;sj t1t2
(for j; k 2 f1; 2g). Evaluation of a formula will now be relative to two worlds of
evaluation (corresponding to the two subjunctive markers s1 and s2), as follows:
K vw Rs1;s2 t1t2½r iff hvalKr ðt1Þ; valKr ðt2Þi 2 Rv;w, and analogously for the other new
atomic formulas. The indexed modal operators quantify into the upper and lower
world index, respectively, of the double turnstile, e.g. thus: K vw }2/½r iff for
some world u 2 K, K vu /½r. The quantifier V1 will range over the individuals
existing at the upper world index, V2 over those at the lower world index, and
similarly for the existential versions. We can then formalize (5) in this extended
language as
}181x:}2Rs2;s1 xx:
In an analogous fashion, one can allow for any finite number or even infinitely
many indexed subjunctive markers, modal operators, and quantifiers.
4 Cross-world comparison via degrees
As far as I am aware, the only method of dealing with cross-world predication that
has been discussed in any detail in the literature is the approach, going back to
Russell (1905), that employs quantification over certain abstract objects (degrees)
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associated with the predicates attributed across worlds. Its origin is Russell’s
anecdote of the irritable yachtsman:
I have heard of a touchy owner of a yacht to whom a guest, on first seeing it,
remarked, ‘‘I thought your yacht was larger than it is’’; and the owner replied,
‘‘No, my yacht is not larger than it is’’. What the guest meant was, ‘‘The size
that I thought your yacht was is greater than the size your yacht is’’; the
meaning attributed to him is, ‘‘I thought the size of your yacht was greater than
the size of your yacht’’. (Russell 1905, p. 489)
As Kripke (2005, p. 1022) has pointed out, Russell botches his own joke, in that
he attributes an overly specific belief to the guest. Briefly: Where Lx is the predicate,
‘‘the yacht has size x,’’ and B is the operator ‘‘the guest believes that,’’ Russell
explains the misunderstanding by disambiguating the guest’s statement into
(a) ½the x: BLx½the y: Lyx [ y, which, according to Russell, is what the guest
meant, and
(b) B ½the x: Lx½the y: Lyx [ yð Þ, ‘‘the meaning attributed to him’’ by the
yachtsman.
Kripke notes that (a) fails adequately to formalize the guest’s statement, because
it implies that there is a unique size of which the guest believed that the yacht had it,
which is clearly not required for the truth of the guest’s remark. It is perhaps also
worth pointing out that the difference between (a) and (b) is in no way due to a
scope ambiguity of definite descriptions—(a) is not a wide-scope version of (b); in
fact, the descriptive scopes are maximally narrow in both (a) and (b). What makes
(a) differ from (b) is rather that the former contains substantively distinct
descriptions (‘‘the x: BLx’’ and ‘‘the y: Ly’’), whereas the descriptions occurring in
the latter are merely alphabetic variants of each other.
Be that as it may, one can fruitfully bring to bear Russellian scope considerations
on the issue, by introducing a mixed-scope reading of (b) above: The formulas
(a0) ½the y: LyB½the x: Lxx [ yð Þ and
(b0) B ½the x: Lx½the y: Lyx [ yð Þ
correctly formalize the two readings of the guest’s ambiguous statement.13
It should be clear how this method can be adapted to enable formalization of the
sentences in groups (1) and (4) in QML. We first paraphrase them as
(6) Mary’s height is such that it might have been the case that John’s height
would have been greater than it,
and then directly formalize (6) in QML as follows:
(60) ½the x : Tmx}½the y: Tjyy [ x,
where Tax means that individual a has height x, and the bound variables range over
heights.
13 Kripke (2005, p. 1023) attributes this reconstruction to Nathan Salmon.
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In general, the Russellian approach will require an appeal to the degrees to which
an individual might possess the positive that corresponds to the comparative
attributed across worlds; in the case of our example, we need to invoke heights as
the degrees to which an individual might be tall. Concomitantly, the modal language
will need to be extended to include a predicate for the graded positive (in the
example, Tax for ‘‘a is x tall’’).
To put this method on a firmer footing, let us consider how to accommodate such
degrees and graded positives in a Kripke structure. The degrees belonging to a
comparative (whether strict or non-strict) should obviously be linearly ordered.
Further, every degree of R-ness is presumably a degree that some individual might
have had, which is to say that for every degree d, there should be a world w in which
some individual a possesses R-ness to degree d.
These informal considerations suggest the following formal definition:
Definition 3 A degree-structure (D-structure for short) K for a signature
R ¼ ðC;PÞ and one strict cross-world comparative R is a septuple
K; w; ðDwÞw2K ; ðcKÞc2C; ðPwÞP2Pw2K ; ðDR; [R; fRÞ; ðTwÞw2K
 
;
whose first five components are exactly as in the standard notion of Kripke structure.
In addition, DR (the set of R-degrees) is a non-empty set strictly linearly ordered by
[R, and fR is a function onto DR that maps each pair ha, wi with a 2 Dw to some
fRða; wÞ 2 DR. Further, for each world w 2 K, Tw is a subset of Dw  DR (the
extension, at w, of the graded positive belonging to R), in such a way that ha; di 2
Tw if and only if fR(a, w) = d.
14
The most convenient way of implementing Russellian cross-world comparison in
the language of QML would then seem to be this: Add a new sort of individual
variables (say h0, h1, . . .) as primitive symbols whose values are restricted to the
members of DR, and add a new binary predicate symbol T whose first argument
place may only be filled with terms of the original sort, and whose second argument
place only accommodates terms of R-degree sort. Bound variables of degree sort
will vary over the entire set DR independently of the world of evaluation; i.e.
K w 8h/½r will hold if and only if for all d 2 DR, K w /½rðh=dÞ. The sentences
in groups (1) and (4) can then be literally formalized in QML by the formula (60),
which receives the desired truth conditions under the semantics just described.
Given the intertranslatability of QML and SML mentioned above, it is clear that
a Russellian analysis could just as well be carried out in the context of SML. What is
perhaps remarkable, however, is that the Russellian degree analysis appears to be
the only way of allowing for cross-world comparisons in QML, whereas SML can
be extended both by Russellian degrees and into the system CSML. I will comment
on this situation in more detail below.
14 In the case of a non-strict cross-world comparative, one would require [R to be a non-strict linear
ordering on DR. In the equivalence relation case, no ordering of the degrees would be required.
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5 Comparison of approaches
In trying to assess the relative merits of the different ways of implementing cross-
world predication, it is important to distinguish two dimensions of comparison:
First, we may ask whether CW-structures or D-structures are the more appropriate
notion of Kripke structure when it comes to cross-world predication; second, we
may ask whether an approach based on QML is preferable to one based on SML, or
vice versa.
As regards the first question, there is a sense in which the notions of model are
equivalent (modulo a first-order abstraction principle): Each D-structure uniquely
determines a CW-structure and conversely. This can be seen as follows.
First, let K be the D-structure
K; w; ðDwÞw2K ; ðcKÞc2C; ðPwÞP2Pw2K ; ðDR; [R; fRÞ; ðTwÞw2K
 
:
For each pair hv, wi of worlds from K, define Rv,w to be the set of all pairs ha, bi
with fRða; vÞ[R fRðb; wÞ. Then K0 defined as follows:
K; w; ðDwÞw2K ; ðcKÞc2C; ðPwÞP2Pw2K ; ðRv;wÞv;w2K
 
is a CW-structure for the same signature as K. To verify this, we need only show
that the relation R as defined below is a strict comparative on the set
fha; vijv 2 K; a 2 Dvg:
ha; viRhb; wi :, ha; bi 2 Rv;w:
By definition, ha; bi 2 Rv;w iff fRða; vÞ[R fRðb; wÞ. Hence irreflexivity and
transitivity of R follow from irreflexivity and transitivity of [R. It remains to
establish the weak connectedness of R. So suppose that neither ha; bi 2 Rv;w nor
hb; ai 2 Rw;v. Then neither fRða; vÞ[R fRðb; wÞ nor fRðb; wÞ[R fRða; vÞ and hence,
by the connectedness of[R, fRða; vÞ ¼ fRðb; wÞ. It follows that ha, vi bears R to the
same pairs as hb, wi does and that the same pairs bear R to ha, vi as do to hb, wi,
and hence R is weakly connected in the requisite sense.15
Now let K be the CW-structure
K; w; ðDwÞw2K ; ðcKÞc2C; ðPwÞP2Pw2K ; ðRv;wÞv;w2K
 
:
In particular, then, the relation R defined as above must be a strict comparative
on fha; vijv 2 K; a 2 Dvg. From R, we can define an equivalence relation *R as
follows:
ha; vi	 Rhb; wi :, :ha; viRhb; wi ^ :hb; wiRha; vi:
Since elements incomparable with respect to a strict comparative on a given
domain must compare in the same way to all elements of the domain, this is
tantamount to saying that the pairs ha, vi and hb, wi are *R-equivalent just in case
15 Similar considerations apply in the case of non-strict comparatives. For cross-world equivalence
relations R, one would define Rv,w as the set of all pairs ha, bi with fRða; vÞ ¼ fRðb; wÞ. It is then obvious
that R must be an equivalence relation.
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they are indiscernible with respect to R. Reflexivity, symmetry, and transitivity of
*R follow readily.
Now we will appeal to the following abstraction principle:
(Abst) With every equivalence relation & on a set D is associated a function
f& with domain D such that
8x8y x 
 y $ f
ðxÞ ¼ f
ðyÞð Þ:
Taking fha; vijv 2 K; a 2 Dvg as the set D and *R as the equivalence relation
&, this principle gives us a function f	 R which will serve us as the desired fR. Let
DR be the range of fR; then fR is obviously onto DR. For elements d and e of DR,
define d [R e if and only if there are pairs ha, vi and hb, wi such that d = fR(a, v),
e = fR(b, w), and ha; bi 2 Rv;w. It is easy to check that [ R is well-defined and a
strict linear order.16
We have now shown that, once abstraction is granted, the two notions of model
are equivalent.17 This takes care of the first dimension of comparison mentioned at
the beginning of this section; if one accepts the abstraction principle, one kind of
structure is as good as the other. The second dimension concerns the choice of
modal object language; and here the situation is not symmetric.
As I pointed out above, the proponent of QML has only one option when it comes
to the formalization of cross-world predication, namely the inclusion of the requisite
sort of degrees in her ontology, and the analysis of
(1a) John might have been taller than Mary is
as
(1R) Mary’s height is such that, under certain circumstances, John’s height would
have been greater than it,
which can then be rendered in the object language as
(1Rf) ½the h: Tmh}½the h0: Tjh0h0 [ h.
Thus this approach cannot avoid an ontological commitment to abstract objects,
viz. the degrees associated with the comparative relation: heights in order to deal
with ‘‘taller than,’’ intelligence quotients, say, for ‘‘smarter than,’’ degrees of
pulchritude for ‘‘prettier than,’’ etc.
On the SML approach, one has three options: First, and least interestingly, one
can follow the same path as the QML theorist and simply add Russellian degrees.
Clearly this incurs the same ontological commitments. Second, one can instead
extend SML to CSML and handle cross-world predication by invoking primitive
16 Given a sufficient amount of set theory, the abstraction principle (Abst) can be proved by taking as
f&(x) the equivalence class of x with respect to &.
17 This result contrasts with Kemp’s (2000) claim that D-structures arise from standard Kripke structures
(i.e. structures without cross-world extensions) by applying the process of abstraction at each possible
world separately, and then collecting all the R-degrees together into one degree set DR. This clearly will
not work, as separate abstractions in v and w will yield ordered degree sets ðDvR; [ vRÞ and ðDwR ; [ wRÞ
relative to v and w, but provide no information as to how elements of DR
v relate to elements of DR
w. In other
words, piecemeal abstraction fails to provide for calibration of degrees across worlds.
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cross-world relations. This option completely eschews any ontological commit-
ments not already present in the original object language, and instead makes do with
a more fine-grained notion of extension. Third, one can combine the first two
options. Indeed, if one values having degrees around, this third option seems to be
the ideal solution.
For consider the inference from (1a) to (1R) again.
The QML analysis has no choice but to treat this as a trivial inference of the form
‘‘A, therefore A,’’ because it must regard (1R) as a mere paraphrase of (1a). But on
the face of it, the inference is not trivial—for one thing, it produces a conclusion
asserting the existence of certain abstract objects from a premise that does not
mention such objects at all.18 The framework that combines CSML with Russellian
degrees, by contrast, renders the inference in the form
}Rs;ijm
)½the h: Timh}½the h0: Tsjh0h0 [ h;
and thus correctly indicates in the logical forms of the object language its non-trivial
nature. Given that QML does not appear to permit a formalization of cross-world
predication with this feature, we are therefore inclined to think that the mood-based
analysis is the solution of choice.
As a final point in favor of CSML, let us ask which English predicates R are
amenable to cross-world predication. As observed by Kemp (2000), it seems to be a
necessary condition that R express either a comparative relation or an equivalence
relation. But that is clearly not sufficient. Consider, for instance, the following pair
of synonymous predicates:
‘‘x is heavier than y is’’ vs. ‘‘x outweighs y’’
While the former can easily be used for cross-world predication (witness ‘‘I
might have been heavier than I am’’), the latter cannot. Try as you might, the best
one can come up with is something like ‘‘I might have outweighed myself,’’ which
is an intra-world comparison, and indeed a false one.
The reason for this asymmetry is clearly that ‘‘x is heavier than y is’’ possesses
two individually inflectible copulas, so that by subjunctivizing one, but not the
other, we achieve predication across worlds. On the other hand, ‘‘x outweighs y’’ can
only accommodate one grammatical mood, which restricts it to intra-world
predication. This logically relevant feature of English and a range of other
languages (cf. our examples from German and French) is made explicit in the
notation of CSML; however, in the analysis based on traditional QML, it is
completely obscured.
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